clause is thought to be applicable to all the duties of directors, for example in relation to their managerial responsibilities, their fiduciary duties and duties arising out of specific provisions of the AktG, see para. 80, 81, 83, 88, 91(2) and 92 thereof. The standard is not that of an ordinary businessman, but that of a man in a leading and responsible position as the manager of other people's property in a specific enterprise. The test is an objective one, and individual abilities are not taken into account.
Furthermore, inability or inexperience is not an excuse. When an action is brought against them, it appears that directors have to show compliance with this strict rule (AktG, para. 93(2), No. 2). The general view is that the due care requirement is an absolute one, irrespective of subjective fault involving some degree of blameworthiness (Vorwerjbarkeit) and any failure, however slight, may result in a requirement to pay damages. However, the German courts and academic commentators do not always seem to have adopted this view.
DIRECTOR'S, SPECIFIC LIABILITIES
Directors are required to have a general insight into management and business conditions, and to have some understanding of the connections between law and society. They should understand the fundamental structure of their own company and have an elementary knowledge of the framework and organisation of companies in general. They should also have some idea of fundamental legal concepts such as directors' fiduciary and other duties. Such fiduciary duties have become recognised through the medium of decisions of the courts rather than that of the Aktiengesetz, but breaches of such duties will usually come within para. 93. When new laws affecting business enterprises are enacted, it may be advisable for directors to take legal advice on such laws: ignorance of them could possibly result in liability. Directors should also be aware of matters relating to the product which the company makes and should certainly be able to comprehend the annual balance sheet. A higher degree of care may be required from professionally qualified directors, such as lawyers, certified accountants, or bankers. This was made apparent in a case heard by the Landgericht of Diisseldorf in 1994 (Die Aktiengesellschqft 1994 in which the court held that the manager of a private company who was an experienced lawyer and who had also served on the board of a large public company, could not escape liability in respect of the private company by pleading that he had relied on an expert opinion which he had requested.
A director is also liable for failure to control his colleagues. If each director has particular functions allocated to him by the statutes of the company, the contract of employment or the company rules (Geschaftsordnung: see AktG, para. 77), then such a director is, in principle, liable in respect of his own sphere of activity. However he may become liable for the activities of fellow directors if he has exercised inadequate supervision over them, or has failed to intervene where the wrongful conduct of a director has become known throughout the business, or where such conduct has failed to become public knowledge through his own lack of care. The division of functions between different directors in one of the ways described in this paragraph does not release any of them from their duty of supervision (Uberwachungsrjflicht), which may be exercised with the help ot agents, where necessary. Many of the decisions of the courts concerning the duties of directors involve this duty of supervision.
Directors must not disclose confidential information and secrets of the company, in particular trade and business secrets, which have become known to them as a result of their service on the management board (AktG, para. 93(1), No. 2). This provision encompasses all the business projects and policies aimed at by the enterprise and applies in relation to the objectives, course, and results of discussions of board meetings.
Unfortunately 'labour directors' (Arbeitsdirektor) who must be appointed in certain large companies, have sometimes been said to have acted in breach of this requirement, as have employees'
representatives and representatives of banks on the supervisory board, who are bound by a corresponding obligation of secrecy.
BURDEN OF PROOF
In an action under AktG, para. 93, the company is required to produce evidence of acts of the directors which have caused damage. As far as the proof of causation is concerned, inference from the surrounding circumstances or the rules of prima facie evidence will support the company's action. Furthermore the question of causation is left to the discretion of the judge in accordance with the provisions of para. 287 of the Civil Procedure Code. Damage is presumed in the special cases mentioned in AktG, para. 93(3), a detailed account of which is beyond the scope of this short article. The general view is that the burden of proof is placed upon the director to show that he exercised the care of a diligent and conscientious manager. However it has been argued by some writers that this reversal of the normal civil burden of proof (which has also been held to apply to private companies and co-operative societies), only applies to the extent that a director has to show that he has not been guilty of subjective fault. According to Goette, who takes an intermediate view, in an influential article in the Zeitschrift jur Gesellschaftrecht for 1995 (at p. 648) the plaintiff has to demonstrate that the damage has been suffered by reason of an act or omission of the director, which may possibly constitute a breach of duty, whilst the director has to show that he has fulfilled his duties, or has not been guilty of subjective fault (conduct which is morally blameworthy), or that the damage would still have ensued if he had complied with his duties.
The Supreme Court may have alleviated somewhat the burden of proof placed on the officer of a co-operative society who had delegated duties to a possibly dishonest or incompetent consultant in a recent case: see NJW 1997 see NJW , 1905 . It required the co-operative society to prove that the officer had allowed the consultant to receive payment for advisory services which were not included in the settlement agreed upon, whilst the officer was required to prove that she had made payments to a competent consultant, who had rendered the appropriate services for such payment, which led to concrete results which were beneficial to the co-operative society'. Thus, in this case, the burden of proving that no breach of duty had occurred in relation to particular matters was laid on each party. Such an approach is perhaps justified in particular cases, especially perhaps where certain duties are delegated. The application of the relevant German rules governing the burden of proof, whatever their precise nature, may well depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case and in many cases it may be hard to predict the outcome. Although the German rules would generally seem to impose a greater burden on directors than do those that are applicable in the UK, they appear workable, although the operation of para. 93(2), No. 2 is open to some dispute. In some situations in which the burden placed on that company is lessened its effect is easy to understand. Thus, for example, a company might assert that its actual assets and resources were less than those shown in the books. The directors would then be called on to explain this deficiency, the reason for which should be within their knowledge. They might well hope to convince the court that this depletion did not take place through any fault of their own, but resulted from inaccurate bookkeeping, for which they could not be held responsible, the assets having been disposed of in specified ways (see BGH BB95, 1754, a case which concerned a private company).
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It would seem that the adoption of a standard of care for directors similar to that which prevails in Germany might be opposed in the UK, especially by directors of small companies and part-time directors. The reversal of the burden of proof, whatever it might entail, would probably also be unpopular in business circles. However there seems nothing objectionable in asking directors to explain matters within their knowledge.
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
The statutes or company rules (Geschqftsordnung) of an AG (Aktiengesellschaft, public stock corporation) often provide that directors shall act by majority resolution. If the resolution is in breach of the company's statutes or the law, the directors who vote for it may incur joint and several liability for damage resulting from it, as may directors who did not vote for the resolution, but who subsequently help to carry it out. Persons who wish to avoid such liability may help themselves to do so by refusing to put their signature to particular transactions and expressing their opposition to them. Furthermore it may sometimes be necessary for them to report such transactions to the supervisory board, which may take various courses of action, including the dismissal of directors, the calling of a general meeting, or ordering that certain transactions may only be carried out with the consent of the supervisory board.
CLARIFICATION NEEDED?
The general view is that the due care requirement is an absolute one, irrespective of subjective fault involving some degree of blameworthiness (Vorwerfbarkeit) and any failure, however slight, may result in a requirement to pay damages. However, the German courts and academic commentators do not always seem to have adopted this view.
Each director who participates in a wrongful act is responsible to the company for the entire resultant damage. However the director will be entitled to a contribution from the other directors who participate in the wrongdoing, the amount of which will vary according to the degree to which they participated in the wrongful act and the nature of the WTongdoing (see art. 426 and 254 of the Civil Code). by the general meeting only expresses a general approval of the management's performance: it does not effect a waiver of claims for damages (AktG, para. 120(2)). A controversial exception to this rule is available by a unanimous vote in favour of the discharge (BGHZ 29.385) . It should be emphasised that no one may exercise voting rights, whether by voting in respect of their own shares or acting as a proxy, or a resolution whereby they become discharged or released from an obligation, or on a determination of whether the company shall assent to a claim against them (AktG, para. 136(1)).
RELEASE FROM LIABILITY

BRINGING ACTIONS AGAINST DIRECTORS
Although the standard of care imposed is rather higher than is the case in the UK, actions by the company, acting either through the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) or the general meeting, against directors who fail to comply with the standard (AktG, para. 112 and 147) are comparatively rare in Germany.
Two interesting decisions of the Landgericht of Diisseldorf concerning, inter alia, actions against directors, are reported in the leading German company law journal Die Aktiengesellschaft of 1994, at p. 328 and 330. The first of these cases concerned the duty of a company to pursue claims against members of the executive board of an insurance company, where breaches of AktG, para. 93 and 116, as well as of an insurance statute, were alleged to have occurred by the plaintiff, a member of the supervisory board of the defendant company. The breaches in question appeared to be serious (certainly in their financial consequences) and deliberate, involving impermissible financial transactions through the medium of wholly-owned subsidiaries with a rather dubious company set up in London. The supervisory board resolved not to sue the finance directors and the chairman of the executive board of the insurance company in respect of the alleged breaches of their duties. The Landgericht held that the plaintiff could avoid the resolution of the supervisory board (which was a nullity) because this board had not given proper attention to the welfare of the insurance company when deciding not to bring proceedings. The relevant directors had been responsible for wrongful acts which had caused very considerable damage to their company; an action could therefore be brought on behalf of the company, against the delinquent directors. Rather surprisingly, the Oberlandesgericht (Regional Appeal Court) of Diisseldorf held, on appeal, that the resolution of the supervisory board was not a nullity, because its members had acted within the scope of their business judgment (Die Aktiengesellschaft 1995, at p. 416). The German Supreme Court adopted a stricter view than the Regional Appeal Court, holding that if the supervisory board came to the conclusion that directors were liable for damages, they should then consider whether action against them would be likely to have a positive result. If they so decided they must pursue the claim unless there were overriding or equally significant contra-indications based on the welfare of the company (Die Aktiengesellschaft 1997, at p. 377).
DEGREE OF CARE
When new laws affecting business enterprises are enacted, it may be advisable for directory to take legal advice on such laws: ignorance of them could possibly result in liability. A higher degree of care may be required from professionally qualified directors, such as lawyers, certified accountants, or bankers.
As an alternative to the bringing of an action bv the 
DUAL PRICING
Pursuant to the Law of 14 July 1991 on Business Practices and
Consumer Information and Protection, prices and rates in Belgium have to be indicated in BEE (Belgian francs). Compulsory pricing in BEE will remain for the period between 1 January 1999 and 31 December 2001.
IMPACT OF THE EURO
The introduction of the Euro will have an important impact on financial markets, especially in a country such as Belgium, where public debt and private savings are amongst the highest in the world.
The bill does not provide for compulsory double-pricing.
However the government is granted the power to impose such compulsory double-pricing (art. 54). Accordingly the government, if necessary, will impose dual pricing either as a general measure or, with respect to trade, of specific services or goods for which such double pricing is particularly needed.
Furthermore the bill provides that for specific contracts, i.e. consumer credit contracts (governed by the Law of 12 June 1991 on Consumer Credit) and mortgage contracts (governed by the Law of 4 August 1992 on Mortgages) issued in Euros, the counter-value of the contract must also be shown to the borrower in BEF.
FISCAL, SOCIAL SECURITY AND LABOUR IMPLICATIONS
The bill (art. 9ff.) provides that, as from 1 January 1999, individuals and companies will be entitled to fill in their tax return (VAT, income tax, etc.) in Euros. Equally they will be able to submit documents in Euros to social security institutions (art. 58).
